
GoPlus Security 🚦 · 2026-10-23 11:56 UTC
⚠️ Exploit breakdown: WAX multi-chain bridge On Oct 22, the @WAX_io bridge across WAX / Solana / Ethereum was attacked. The attacker “withdrew” mapped tokens on the WAX side without paying anything. The Solana and Ethereum sides still paid out as normal. Five withdrawals in total: ~52,986 USDC, 21,558 USDT, 840 DAI, 2.55 WETH, 0.11 WBTC. Root cause: a negative fee on `withdraw` zeroed the debit The WAX-side bridge contract `eth.token` — the mint and bridge-accounting contract for mapped tokens WAXUSDC / WAXUSDT / WAXDAI / WAXWETH / WAXWBTC, issuer `bridge.wax` — has a signed-amount check flaw in `withdraw(from, to_eth_address, quantity, max_fee, chain_name)`: • The contract charges `debit = quantity + fee`, and intends `max_fee ≥ 0`. • The attacker set `max_fee` to `quantity` (for a 52,986.497732 WAXUSDC withdrawal, they passed `52,986.497732`). The actual debit was exactly 0. • When the debit was zero, the contract skipped the balance-deduction and check path (a zero-amount transfer does not trigger `sub_balance`). The withdrawal still posted and created a cross-chain withdrawal record. Attacker account ` held a balance of zero on `eth.token` for all five tokens the whole time (`get_currency_balance` all 0). No payment was made at any point. 📌 Attacker addresses WAX: Solana: Ethereum: Exploited contract: Example attack tx:
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