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- Multiple Binance (@binance) hot wallets across several chains, including Ethereum, Arbitrum and Avalanche, were reportedly compromised, with losses reported so far estimated at ~$5.6B—potentially the largest crypto hack on record. For example, on Ethereum, Binance 14 (0x28C6c0) was delegated via EIP-7702 to an unverified sweeper contract (0x63e842), with 0x7c8601 hardcoded as its authorized operator. Dozens of assets (e.g., ETH, USDT, USDC) were swept through several batch calls to multiple addresses. The pattern suggests compromised signing or privileged operator access, though the initial compromise remains unknown. The team is reportedly investigating. According to the cited @cz_binance update, Tether froze ~$971M and Circle froze ~$823M. USD1 also announced steps to freeze another $27M associated with the reported hack, bringing the total frozen or targeted for freezing to approximately $1.82B. One of the attack TX: BlockSec
- SELLAS Life Sciences Announces Positive Pivotal Phase 3 REGAL Trial Data Showing Immunotherapeutic Cancer Vaccine, Galinpepimut-S (GPS), Demonstrated a Statistically Significant and Clinically Meaningful Improvement in Overall Survival in Patients with Ac - GNW GlobeNewswire
- ⚠️ Exploit breakdown: WAX multi-chain bridge On Oct 22, the @WAX_io bridge across WAX / Solana / Ethereum was attacked. The attacker “withdrew” mapped tokens on the WAX side without paying anything. The Solana and Ethereum sides still paid out as normal. Five withdrawals in total: ~52,986 USDC, 21,558 USDT, 840 DAI, 2.55 WETH, 0.11 WBTC. Root cause: a negative fee on `withdraw` zeroed the debit The WAX-side bridge contract `eth.token` — the mint and bridge-accounting contract for mapped tokens WAXUSDC / WAXUSDT / WAXDAI / WAXWETH / WAXWBTC, issuer `bridge.wax` — has a signed-amount check flaw in `withdraw(from, to_eth_address, quantity, max_fee, chain_name)`: • The contract charges `debit = quantity + fee`, and intends `max_fee ≥ 0`. • The attacker set `max_fee` to `quantity` (for a 52,986.497732 WAXUSDC withdrawal, they passed `52,986.497732`). The actual debit was exactly 0. • When the debit was zero, the contract skipped the balance-deduction and check path (a zero-amount transfer does not trigger `sub_balance`). The withdrawal still posted and created a cross-chain withdrawal record. Attacker account ` held a balance of zero on `eth.token` for all five tokens the whole time (`get_currency_balance` all 0). No payment was made at any point. 📌 Attacker addresses WAX: Solana: Ethereum: Exploited contract: Example attack tx: GoPlus Security 🚦
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- 🚨 GoPlus Security Alert: Widespread Malicious Code Injection in Optimizely Web Customer Projects On November 16, attackers injected malicious code into custom JavaScript across multiple Optimizely Web customer projects, causing affected websites to serve malicious content through previously trusted scripts. The incident affected 178 organizations, including websites operated by CNN, Zoom, BBC, GitLab, and Ledger. The malicious code attempts to swap crypto recipient addresses for attacker-controlled addresses on pages, in input fields, and in the clipboard. It can also skim payment card details entered into affected sites’ forms, steal non-HttpOnly cookies, capture page screenshots, and deliver Coruna / DarkSword exploits targeting certain iOS devices. Card details inside hosted payment iframes, such as those from Stripe and Adyen, were outside the script’s direct reach. For attacker addresses, which have received approximately $7K, and the list of affected websites, see: GoPlus has blocklisted the attacker addresses. Exercise caution on affected sites and double-check recipient addresses before sending funds. 🛡 Security Recommendations Website operators: Inspect custom code in your Optimizely projects and experiments. Review accounts, API tokens, and write permissions. Monitor third-party scripts for changes and unexpected outbound connections. Crypto users: Review recipient addresses you copied or entered on affected websites on November 16, along with any transactions you initiated. Always double-check recipient addresses before sending funds, and watch for unauthorized transactions. iOS users: Update to the latest iOS or iPadOS version available for your device. Report URI notes that the exploit kit’s own comments identify versions 18.7.3 and later, and 26.3 and later, as patched. Monitor your wallets for unauthorized transactions. GoPlus Security 🚦
- #Lighter Incident Breakdown: Nonce Reuse in Custom Signing Code Enabled API Private Key Recovery 1️⃣ Affected Accounts An attacker derived the API private keys for two trading accounts on Lighter and used them to move funds out of those accounts. Approximately $15.48M was reportedly affected, with around $5M in USDC recovered and returned to the affected trader by the Lighter Security Council. Reported affected accounts: Account 1: Lighter Account ID: 714710 Associated onchain address: 0x0d1D09312665D31Ed68231b88079a245E0458F6F Amount affected: ~$10.39M Account 2: Lighter Account ID: 714723 Associated onchain address: 0x66Cf2f85115CC20bF439720927C1f93De9672068 Amount affected: ~$5.09M 2️⃣ Root Cause The affected accounts used insecure, unofficial signing code that reused cryptographic signing nonces across different transactions. This allowed the attacker to derive the API private keys from publicly available signatures. Lighter said its protocol, smart contracts, and official SDKs were unaffected. The attacker moved the funds through the following sequence: Create a public pool using the compromised account → Mint pool shares to an attacker-controlled account → Transfer the victim’s funds into the pool, increasing its net asset value (NAV) without issuing corresponding shares to the victim → Redeem the attacker’s shares and withdraw the funds. 3️⃣ Funds Withdrawn The attacker withdrew approximately 10.39M USDC from Lighter and swapped the proceeds for ETH. Onchain tracing identified part of the proceeds moving through multiple wallets to buy XMR1 on Hyperliquid. XMR1 should not be conflated with native Monero ($XMR). The available evidence does not establish that these purchases drove up Monero’s price. 4️⃣ Reported Attacker Account and Address Lighter Account ID: 769455 Associated onchain address: 0xb3fffca23d4444eE73349825ACD84f7b5020e387 🛡️ Security Recommendations ▪️ Use Lighter’s official Python, Go, or TypeScript SDKs, or its Agent Kit. Avoid implementing your own signing logic. ▪️ Let the official signer handle cryptographic signing nonces. Never reuse a signing nonce or substitute timestamps, counters, weak random values, or cached values. Signing nonces are distinct from transaction nonces. ▪️ If your code may have reused signing nonces, revoke and replace all related API keys immediately. Fixing the code alone isn’t enough. ▪️ Enable IP allowlisting and per-key permissions and limits as they become available. Separate permissions for trading, transfers, pool creation, and redemptions wherever supported. ▪️ Lighter now requires wallet signatures for transfers into public pools and no longer exposes API signatures publicly. GoPlus Security 🚦
- 1/7 ⚠️ Exploit Analysis: On November 14, @KAVA_CHAIN’s native lending protocol Kava Lend was exploited. The attacker reduced the net supply of its largely inactive BUSD market to just 2 base units, inflating the market’s supply interest index by approximately 243,000× in about three minutes. The attacker then used inflated BUSD deposit claims to borrow 55,205,050.60 KAVA across 127 transactions—worth approximately $3.76 million at the pre-attack price. 🔍 Root Cause: Kava Lend uses the supply interest index, supplyInterestFactor, to distribute interest paid by borrowers to depositors. It divides the interest accrued since the previous block, newInterest, by the market’s net supply, totalSupply (cash + borrows − reserves). The public code skips the division and returns a neutral factor when net supply is exactly zero, but does not guard against a positive yet extremely small denominator. When totalSupply approaches zero while remaining positive, the resulting supply interest index can become massively inflated. The attacker first repaid all 37 outstanding BUSD loans on behalf of their borrowers, then used a single deposit–borrow–withdraw transaction to reduce net supply to 2 base units (2×10⁻⁸ BUSD). The tiny amount of interest accrued each block was then divided by these 2 base units, causing the index to rise from approximately 2.76 to 671,186.99—roughly 243,000×—in about three minutes. As a result, the main wallet’s previously deposited BUSD was recorded as a claim worth approximately 1.25449 billion BUSD. The attacker then used a second wallet in a loop: the helper wallet deposited BUSD as collateral; the main wallet withdrew the same BUSD against its inflated deposit claim; and the helper wallet borrowed KAVA at a loan-to-value ratio of approximately 50%. In the next block, the main wallet liquidated the helper wallet. Despite there being almost no BUSD left in the pool to seize—the first liquidation auction had a lot of 0 BUSD—the loan was still closed, freeing up capacity under the KAVA borrowing cap. The configured maximum_limit for ukava was equivalent to 448,358 KAVA. GoPlus Security 🚦
- ⚠️ Cursor has published a security incident report on the earlier supply chain attack. According to the investigation, the attacker used access keys issued by Cursor to Fireworks and subsequently exposed on Fireworks’ side to gain access to some of Cursor’s SaaS services and internal systems. The attacker ultimately tampered with the distribution cache for the Claude Code extension to collect information about users’ machines and install SSH backdoors. The compromised versions were Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 in Cursor’s VS Code extension marketplace distribution cache, affecting macOS and Windows. The exposure window ran from October 29 at 17:27 to October 30 at 04:35 (UTC+8), with up to approximately 5,000 users affected. Security recommendation: If you installed or updated to either affected version through Cursor’s marketplace during this window, read the official notice as soon as possible and run the remediation script for your platform to check for and remediate any compromise: Fireworks’ initial announcement and subsequent update: GoPlus Security 🚦
- 🚨 GoPlus Security Alert: Telegram’s recently introduced HTML widgets feature poses a remote code execution risk. Security researchers have demonstrated the issue through bot messages on Android and Desktop. Although Telegram has rolled out some fixes, patch coverage remains incomplete, with potential bypasses still possible, particularly on PC. 🛡️ Security Recommendations: 1. Avoid interacting with unknown bots, and do not click “Start.” 2. Do not open unfamiliar chats or suspicious links. 3. Once a complete fix is confirmed, promptly update to the latest version of Telegram. 4. Trust only officially verified channels. GoPlus Security 🚦
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